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Themes in Contemporary Legal
Philosophy
[Ronald Dworkin, Professor of Jurisprudence, The University of Oxford,
and Professor of Law, New York University, spoke at the AALS Workshop
on Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy held at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
on Maich 20-22, 1986. His oral remarks at the Workshop were a summary of
his book, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1986), which has since
been published. The reader is referred to the book for a statement of his
views.

The Connection Between Law and
Morality: Comments on Dworkin
David Lyons

Our discussions yesterday seemed haunted by a contrast-never quite
formulated-between Natural Law and Legal Positivism. The standard
interpretation turns on the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and
morality. Positivism has often been understood to hold, and Natural Law to
deny, that there can be unjust laws.
It is clear who wins that argument. But Positivism seems to win too easily.
And our official representative from the Natural Law tradition agreed that
there can be unjust laws.
Recent work in legal theory-especially work by Ronald Dworkin-has
given subtler shape to the idea of a "necessary connection" between law and
morals. Dworkin, among others, has suggested the following view (though
this may diverge from his most recent suggdstions). The rule of law requires
fairness-fairness in the sense of, say, treating like cases alike, evenhandedness, or going on as before. But this calls for interpretation. Courts need to
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interpret what has gone on before-the law we have-so that they can carry
it forward.
But interpretation is not normatively neutral. It is called for in the service
of justified decisions, so it seeks an interpretation that justifies what law we
have. Indeed, it seeks to understand what we have in the best light possible.
Dworkin suggests another idea: that what law is can best be understood by
way of interpretation itself-by determining how judges should decide cases.
If we put these two ideas together we get the notion of a "necessary connection" between law and morality. What law is can best be understood by way
of the interpretation of existing law, and sound interpretation-interpretation that is faithful to the rule of law-looks at the law we have in the best
light possible, and specifically in terms of its best justification.
This gives us two questions. First, is it in fact correct to suppose that past
official decisions (including judicial, legislative and constitutional decisions) should be interpreted in terms of the best justification that can be
given them, or in the best light possible? Second, is it true that law is best
understood as fundamentally a matter of the decisions that judges (and
perhaps other officials) should on that basis make?
I shall offer two comments. First, it does seem plausible to hold that
judicial and other official decisions should be based on the best interpretation of what law we have. If we want decisions to be justified and indeed as
good as possible-while at the same time faithful to the rule of law-then we
want officials to look at the law on which they base their decisions in the best
light possible.
But, secondly, the best justification for the law of a particular jurisdiction
may be very poor indeed. It may not even be possible to justify what has gone
on before. The law of the land as a whole may be morally bankrupt. This is
not a mere abstract possibility. We can find examples of such law in living
memory, and quite likely at the present time.
Nor are these issues merely theoretical; they are profoundly practical, for
they concern what constitutes fidelity to law and how judges should decide
cases. The practical importance of jurisprudential theory is one of the
lessons that I believe Dworkin has tried to teach us.
The upshot is that law can be so bad that fairness cannot plausibly be
understood to require going on as before. That may be required in some
circumstances, but it cannot be supported, to the slightest degree, in all.
Officials may routinely be faced with a moral predicament. They can have
a choice which amounts to a significant conflict of duties. Whatever force
there is to the duty of fidelity to law can conflict with the duty not to become
the instrument of injustice.
Sometimes, however, the system within which officials work does not
merely contain significant injustice but is, as I have suggested, morally
bankrupt. Then any duty of fidelity to law must disappear entirely. The rule
of law can claim then no value at all.
So, in response to the question whether law is best understood in terms of
the decisions that officials are required by law to make, we can say: If it is, it
will be so only in a sense that is compatible with the points I have just made.
This means that we must take the subtle new version of a "necessary
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connection" between law and morality with a grain of salt. Looking at law
in the best light possible, we may see something that is, after all, unjustifiable. The "necessary connection" between law and morality is at best a
matter of aspiration or promise-or, perhaps, pretense-rather than guaranteed achievement. So the ideas about interpretation and their bearing on
what law is that have been advanced by Dworkin and others should not lead
us to assume that law always merits even the smallest measure of respect.

